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THE ROLE OF IMPARTIALITY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

**A MONOGRAPH
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
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
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ABSTRACT

As some projections indicate, over 90% of the U.S. Army's future operations will be what many refer to as low intensity conflict. A significant portion of these operations will be either peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Recognizing the unique nature of these operations, it is imperative that planners develop the skills required to apply operational art to such operations. A key component in the operational design of a campaign is the correct identification of both enemy and friendly centers of gravity. This monograph examines the question "Is the impartiality of the peace support force a friendly center of gravity?"

Organized into six sections, section one of the monograph introduces the problem, and discusses its overall significance. The second section reviews British operations in Northern Ireland, and the role that impartiality played in these operations. The third section addresses classical and modern definitions of the center of gravity, along with the various levels of peace operations. The fourth section studies U.S. operations in both Beirut and Lebanon, with a special focus on the role of impartiality. Using these two case studies, and the framework of analysis developed in section three, section five seeks to identify trends and patterns concerning the role of impartiality. Finally, the monograph concludes that impartiality is indeed a "hub of power" for the peace support force; thus, the planner should consider it as a friendly center of gravity.

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INTRODUCTION

The history of peace operations suggests that some failures can be traced to the friendly force's inability to maintain its impartiality. Specifically, experiences in Northern Ireland, Lebanon, and Somalia support the hypothesis that a friendly center of gravity for a peace operations force may be its impartiality. Furthermore, a study of these three operations provides numerous examples where peacekeepers failed to make the requisite changes to their force structure, tactics, and policies that could have protected this crucial center of gravity. In many instances the loss of this impartiality was a factor that led to protracted conflict, and eventual failure. Conversely, recent peace operations suggest the force that protects its impartiality has a far greater chance of accomplishing its mission in accordance with its international mandate. The need to effectively plan and execute such peace operations, to include maintaining the force's impartiality, is certain to remain a key issue for military planners in the future. One observer notes:

... almost any recent intelligence, think tank, or academic analysis has concluded that the most likely use of military forces in the next 5 to 15 years will be in the 'non-traditional' category or 'unconventional combat' under strict rules of engagement.¹

As noted by the Army's Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer, future operations will most likely be "on the lower end of the intensity scale."² Many of these low intensity operations will likely fall into the category of peace operations; the U.S. Army can expect to play a key role in these operations. As is the case in mid to high intensity operations, the operational artist must be able to effectively apply the elements of operational design when planning a peace operation.

While the Army's senior leaders stress that peace operations will comprise a large share of its future missions, some observers cite a deficiency in the Army's collective body of knowledge concerning such operations. A recent Rand study noted that the U.S. Army's efforts to develop a coherent doctrine for planning and executing peace operations is far from adequate. The study noted that the Army's efforts have not gone beyond "... developing a draft peace operations field manual, and talking up how the well-prepared soldier can do just about anything given good leadership and a little tailored training."³ The study warned that while the Army continues to focus its efforts on planning for major regional conflicts (MRC), it "... will be 'graded' by Congress and the American public on how it dealt with the contingency that happened, not the one that did not."⁴ These contingencies will certainly include peace operations.

Reinforcing the view that the Army's peace operations doctrine is far from adequate, one researcher noted, "Until very recently, no real effort was made to develop an operational art that applies specifically to MOOTW."⁵ While peace operations differ significantly from conventional operations, many emphasize that selected features of operational art can be used by planners in the operational design of peace operations. Essentially, the operational art used for peace operations should contain the basic components of that used for conventional operations, yet it should be tailored for the unique challenges presented by peacekeeping.⁶

Operational art used for conventional operations has many characteristics that are also common to peace operations. Essentially, there are four unifying theoretical

questions which form the foundation for operational art. One researcher observed that those common questions include:

- ... 1) What military conditions must be met to produce the desired goal?
- 2) What sequence of actions is most likely to provide that condition?
- 3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish the desired sequence?
- 4) What are the costs and risks of performing that sequence?⁷

Further elaborating on operational art, military theorist Dr. James Schneider identified some key elements of the “operational canvas.” Included in this “operational canvas” are, theaters of interest, lines of operation, decisive and objective point, and centers of gravity. Of these elements, Dr. Schneider cites the concept of center of gravity as “the key design concept at all levels of operational art.”⁸ This monograph shall focus on identification of the friendly center of gravity in peace operations.

Research Methodology and Structure

This monograph will attempt to answer the question “Is the impartiality of the friendly force a center of gravity?” In order to answer this question, the study must answer the following subordinate questions: 1) What are peace operations, and how do they differ from “conventional” military operations? 2) What factors have been identified as preventing military forces from accomplishing their mission in past peacekeeping operations? 3) Are any of these factors common to more than one operation? and, 4) Of these factors, do any fit the classical definition of a center of gravity?

BACKGROUND

The British Army's long and bloody experience in Northern Ireland provides an excellent point of departure for a study of impartiality in peace operations. It was in Northern Ireland that the British Army, a peace support force, lost its impartiality through a series of unrelated yet profound actions and policies. Once this impartiality was lost, operations in this war torn region slid from peace enforcement into the more violent domain of low intensity conflict. In retrospect, the British Army believed that a vital friendly center of gravity it left unprotected was its impartiality.⁹

Plagued by sectarian violence between Protestants and Catholics since 1169, Northern Ireland was wracked by a new wave of violence in the late 1960's. While the efforts of the Royal Ulster Constabulary succeeded in reducing the effectiveness of the IRA by 1962, the IRA succeeded in regaining its strength and influence by the late 1960's. By October, 1968, Protestant and Catholic extremists were again battling in the streets. The level of violence continued to increase, until the government of Northern Ireland called for aid from Great Britain.¹⁰

Deployed to Northern Ireland in late 1969, the British Army was soon viewed by most residents of Northern Ireland as a neutral in the sectarian violence that had plagued the region. Since its arrival, it earned a reputation as being unbiased and even handed in its application of force. Both Catholics and Protestants soon became convinced that the army would protect them from the reign of terror that had come to characterize life in Northern Ireland. No longer was the IRA viewed as the base of power in the region, nor

did the Catholics view the IRA as their sole protectors. The IRA soon saw a reduction in the amount of support it was receiving from Irish Catholics, and by early 1970 many Catholics saw the British as a truly neutral enforcer of the peace.¹¹ Sadly, a series of policies, accidents, and actions would tarnish the Army's reputation as an impartial guarantor of the peace.

The first of these actions which would soon change the image of the British Army as an impartial force was the "get tough" policy. The purpose of this policy was to further reduce the level of violence in the region; however it would have negative long term consequences. Enacted in April of 1970 as the result of a confrontation between Protestants and Catholics during which several soldiers were injured, the policy declared that individuals hurling petrol bombs would be shot on sight. Since Catholic youths had been identified as those throwing the petrol bombs during the scuffle, Catholics viewed the act as directed against them in particular.¹² Slowly, the British were no longer viewed as neutrals, and it would not take long for the IRA to take advantage of this change.

In mid 1970, an inadvertent lapse by the British Army further eroded the view that it was an impartial force. Defending Belfast's St. Matthew's Church against a Protestant gang intent on burning it down, the Catholics inside appealed to the British Army for help. Having no forces available for a timely response, the Army never arrived; however, the IRA did. For many Irish Catholics, this further confirmed their view that the British were far from impartial. More ominously, this event also allowed the IRA to regain some of the support it had lost since the British deployment to Northern Ireland.

Finally, the policy of Internment solidified the Catholic view that the British Army favored the Protestants. This 1971 policy authorized the Army to arrest and inter subjects without trial. It proved to be a disaster for the British Army, since the first 350 subjects arrested under its provisions were Irish Catholics. Once again, the British Army was viewed by the Catholics as far from impartial. While most observers believed the Protestants were equally as responsible for the violence in Northern Ireland, the appearance was that the British Army was focusing its efforts exclusively on Catholics.¹³

Finally, on 31 January 1972, the British Army killed 13 Irish Catholics in what would come to be known as "Bloody Sunday." In the eyes of all parties to the conflict, the British Army was no longer a neutral enforcer of the peace. What began for the British Army as a peace support operation had evolved into a low intensity conflict. While this slide to low intensity conflict can be attributed to a variety of factors, clearly, the loss of impartiality must be considered as one of them.¹⁴ With the loss of its impartiality in the eyes of the belligerents, the British Army lost the ability to accomplish its mission within the context of a peace operation.

THEORY/DEFINITIONS

Discussion without definition is impossible.

Sir Edmund Grey

A review of some theoretical concepts provides an essential foundation for study of the monograph question. This review will consist of classical and modern views of the center of gravity, and definitions of various peace support operations. Additionally, it will discuss the relationship of impartiality to the application of force in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. An understanding of these concepts is essential to a focused review of operations in both Beirut and Somalia.

The Center of Gravity

As Carl von Clausewitz observed in On War, correct identification of centers of gravity is an essential element of military operations. Defining the center of gravity as "... the hub of all power and movement, on which everything else depends,"¹⁵ he noted that it is "... a major act of strategic judgment to distinguish these centers of gravity in the enemy's forces and to identify their spheres of effectiveness."¹⁶ While Clausewitz identified the mass of enemy troops as the most typical center of gravity, he also left open the possibility that other, more abstract concepts, could be considered as a center of gravity. For instance, he noted that "... in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion."¹⁷

Modern interpretations of the center of gravity proceed in the same vein. While most hold that the center of gravity is a physical entity, they fall short of precluding a

concept such as national will for consideration as a center of gravity. For instance, in “Clausewitz and the Illusive Center of Gravity,” Dr. James Schneider of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) observes that at the operational level, the center of gravity is almost always the concentration of combat force.¹⁸ However, Dr. Schneider’s analysis concerns the operational level of conventional operations; he does not consider centers of gravity for peace support operations. His analysis is typical of most works concerning the center of gravity; their focus has normally been on conventional operations.

While the U.S. Army’s FM 100-5, Operations, also views the center of gravity as a physical entity, it does not preclude the possibility that the center of gravity can be more abstract. For instance, in their discussion of the center of gravity of Iraqi forces during the Gulf War, the authors of FM 100-5 note that:

The Iraqi Republican Guard is a good example. Although not located in Kuwait, it was the real source of power necessary for Iraq to hold that country. The destruction of the Republican Guard was seen as the center of gravity for achieving the strategic goal of removing the Iraqi forces from Kuwait.¹⁹

However, the authors leave open the possibility that in some operations the center of gravity can also be “. . . public opinion, national will, and an alliance or coalition structure.”²⁰

The Canadian Army, with extensive peacekeeping experience, takes a slightly different view of the center of gravity. In CFP 300-1, Conduct of Land Operations, the Canadians make clear that the center of gravity can indeed be an “abstract” concept. The Canadians note that “At the strategic level the center of gravity may often be abstract,

such as the enemy's public opinion or perhaps his strength of national purpose."²¹

Emphasizing that the center of gravity can be "... moral or physical. ..." they note that concepts such as the "... coherence of the force. ..." at the operational level can also meet the definition of a center of gravity. Clearly, the Canadians believe that the planner must consider far more variables than merely the mass of troops when searching for a center of gravity.

Eschewing the view that there can only be one center of gravity, Colonel (Ret.) John A. Warden provides a theoretical construct that leaves open the possibility of multiple centers of gravity. In "The Enemy as a System," Warden describes the nation-state as a system. In this system there are multiple sources of power, to include the leadership, infrastructure, organic essentials, population, and finally, the military force. Warden makes the point that the search for the center of gravity must go beyond "the mass of troops." Thus, using Warden's model, a view that considers both the operational force and an abstract concept such as impartiality is certainly possible.²²

U.S. planners involved in the operational design of Uphold Democracy recognized that the center of gravity could be an abstract concept. During the planning process, planners came to the conclusion that the "enemy" center of gravity in Haiti was instability. This perception of instability among the population was the "hub of all power" that perpetuated the violence in Haiti. Planners realized that if they could identify decisive points associated with this center of gravity, they could accomplish their mission of restoring a safe and secure environment to the island nation. The Uphold

Democracy planners demonstrated that the concept of a center of gravity could be applied to peace support operations.²³

Peace Support Operations

Peace support operations include many sub-categories. The two categories which this monograph will focus on include peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE). While the definition of both appears to vary in numerous documents, the key variables which distinguish both PK and PE are level of consent, level of force, and level of impartiality of the peace support force (PSF).²⁴ Using these variables, this section will establish a framework wherein the relationship of these variables is established.

In FM 100-23, Peace Operations, the U.S. Army defines PK as

. . . military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PK activities include observation and monitoring of truces and cease fires and supervision of truces.²⁵

In PK, the level of consent by all parties to the conflict is considered high, while the level of force that the PSF can apply is low. During most PK operations the PSF can only apply force in self-defense, or to prevent the international mandate from interference by the belligerents. Finally, the PSF's level of impartiality is high.²⁶

On the far end of the peace operations continuum lies PE. Peace Operations defines PE as

Peace enforcement is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of PE is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.²⁷

In PE, the level of consent is far less than that found in PK. Many PE operations are conducted under the provisions of United Nations Chapter VII. In many instances PE operations are characterized by conventional combat operations. While NATO doctrine cites examples of PE operations conducted under the provisions of United Nations Chapter VII as the Korean and Gulf Wars,²⁸ U.S. doctrine includes operations in Somalia.²⁹ In PE operations, force is applied to coerce hostile factions “. . . to cease and desist from violent actions.”³⁰ Furthermore, the level of impartiality is far less than it is in PK. The application of force in PK is focused on restoring conditions that facilitate return to a safe and secure environment.

Impartiality

Across the continuum of PSO, a common variable is the role of impartiality. The actual and perceived impartiality of the PSF has been noted in numerous publications.

The authors of Peace Operations observe that

A peace operation is likewise influenced by the degree to which the force acts . . . in an impartial manner and the degree to which the belligerent parties perceive the force to be impartial. PK requires an impartial, even handed approach. PE also involves impartiality, which may change over time and with the nature of operations.³¹

NATO doctrine adds that the PSF is unlikely to receive consent from the belligerents in a PE operation; therefore, the maintenance of impartiality is not as high a priority. NATO maintains that PE operations will conform closely to conventional combat doctrine.³²

Both NATO and U.S. doctrine address the relationship of impartiality to both PK and PE. Both note that the loss of impartiality in a PK operation can lead to PE. As the authors of Peace Operations observe:

Compromised impartiality may trigger an uncontrollable escalation from a PK to a PE situation by crossing the consent divide. . . . Regardless of the type of operations, commanders should always strive to increase levels of consent and impartiality and reduce the levels of force.³³

Some authors refer to an “impartiality line” when describing the transition from PK to PE. Past peace operations highlight the difficulty of moving back to a PK scenario once this line has been crossed.³⁴

As we study the following cases to determine if impartiality is a friendly center of gravity, we must remember that peace operations are fundamentally different from conventional operations. Perhaps one of the greatest of these differences is highlighted in Peace Operations, where it states, “. . . the conflict, not the belligerent parties, is the enemy.”³⁵ Acknowledging this profound difference, and recognizing the key role that impartiality plays in enabling the PSF to accomplish its assigned missions, one author observed that

Forces conducting peacekeeping have a center of gravity which may be their credibility as an impartial force between the belligerents. When that credibility is lost, they become simply another armed force in the conflict area and cease to be a peacekeeping force.³⁶

This section has reviewed the theory of a center of gravity, the spectrum of peace operations, and the impact of impartiality across that spectrum. These concepts form the framework within which the monograph will examine two historical case studies: one in Beirut, and the other in Somalia. An examination of these case studies, using this theoretical framework, will provide the insights necessary to answer the monograph question.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

This section will study two historical examples of peace operations in order to determine the role of impartiality in such operations. Using the theoretical framework developed in the previous section, the monograph will review operations in both Beirut and Somalia. Specifically, this inquiry will focus on how the PSF's level of impartiality changed the nature of the operation. If there is an impartiality "line," then the point where the force crossed that line should be apparent. Additionally, crossing of the impartiality line should also lead to a change in the context of the operation. For example, a PK operation which crosses this line should evolve into a PE operation. Likewise, a PE operation responsive to the level of impartiality should evolve into a low intensity conflict scenario as the force's impartiality decreases. Finally, if a relationship between the impartiality of the force and the nature of the peace operation is identified, then one must consider the role impartiality plays as a source of power for the PSF. A closer examination of both case studies should help reach tentative conclusions to these questions.

Beirut

This history of Lebanon, and its capital Beirut, is typical of many of the regions in which peacekeepers find themselves. Over time, Lebanon's changing demographics, the clash between Islam and Christianity, and the inability of its political structure to accommodate these changes soon led to violence. Walking a precarious tightrope for much of its history, Lebanon first slid into the abyss of civil war in 1948.

A legacy of French colonialism, Lebanon's government was a mosaic of various cultures and religions. Appointments to the government were divided between various religious groups. Prior to 1932, Lebanese found the country's demographics made it possible to equitably distribute power. A 1932 census revealed the ratio of Christians to Muslims was six to five - the distribution of power in the national government reflected this. However, this delicate balance would come to an end with the creation of Israel in 1948.³⁷

Throughout the 1940's the Muslim population of Lebanon was reproducing at a faster rate than the Christian population. The creation of Israel in 1948 further exacerbated this problem. Soon, a flood of Palestinian refugees began entering Lebanon across the country's southern border with Israel. The complex system which assured a fair distribution of power was threatened by these changes. In the years to follow, Lebanon would be wracked by civil war as both Muslims and Christians battled to change the nation's political power structure. As a result of the growing number of Muslim militias in the south, the government lost control of this region. While Christians maintained control of the government in Beirut, their overall power and influence was greatly diminished.³⁸ This absence of control would provide the impetus for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

With Muslim militias in south Lebanon threatening Israeli settlements in northern Israel, the Israeli Army invaded Lebanon in June 1982. Another factor was the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) long established presence in Beirut. The Israelis cleared southern Lebanon of the militias in the south, and by 13 June, surrounded

Beirut. With Beirut surrounded, and the PLO leadership trapped within the city, the international community agreed to supervise the withdrawal of the Yasir Arafat and his Palestinians.³⁹

The departure of the Palestinians heralded the arrival of American forces into Beirut. As part of a multinational force, the U.S. would contribute an 800 man contingent of Marines. The Marines' mission would be limited; they would help monitor the departure of the PLO, and depart shortly thereafter. In fact, then President Ronald Reagan stipulated that the mission would not exceed 30 days. The Marines departed on 10 September, 1982, a full two weeks prior to the 30 day deadline.⁴⁰ However, events in Beirut would soon call the Marines back to the war torn city.

The assassination of Lebanon's President-elect Bashir Gemayel on September 14th was but one event that would provide the impetus for the Marines' return; on the same day, Israel invaded West Beirut. Soon thereafter the infamous Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres occurred. Many observers asserted that the situation in Lebanon would not have worsened had the Marines not departed. Apparently agreeing with this view, the Reagan administration ordered the return of the Marines.⁴¹ According to the President, the Marines would return to Beirut to enable "... the Lebanese government to restore full sovereignty over its capital, the essential precondition for extending its control over the entire country."⁴² The Marines would support the central government.

The return of the Marines was approved by the Lebanese government, and had the tacit approval of most of the militias. The Marines were optimistic that they could accomplish their mission of restoring order and stability to the city. Beirutis saw some

semblance of order return to their city, and they embraced the return of the Marines. This period proved to be short, as the Marines soon played a pivotal role in a series of policy decisions that would bring into doubt the impartiality of the American peacekeepers.⁴³

The Marines moved beyond their “presence” role as the result of a request by Lebanon’s new president, Amin Gemayel. Gemayel wanted the Marines to help train and re-equip the Lebanese Army. With Washington’s approval, the Marines began rebuilding the Lebanese Army, while U.S. Special Forces advisers provided the Lebanese General staff with advice on troop movements and related operational matters. In the eyes of most Lebanese, and more importantly the militias, the Marines were slowly becoming allies of the Lebanese Army.⁴⁴ As one observer noted, “President Gemayel, instead of using the Marines as a crutch to rebuild his country, began using them as a club to beat his Muslim opponents.”⁴⁵

Soon after the decision to assist in the rebuilding of the Lebanese Army, Marines on patrol began to notice a change in the attitudes of Beirutis. By the spring of 1993, the patrols became the frequent target of rock throwing boys, and were often taunted with obscenities.⁴⁶ The situation continued to worsen; by June of 1983 the U.S. embassy in Beirut would bear the brunt of a suicide bomber’s rage. As one author points out:

In retrospect, the destruction of the American Embassy should have been the first clue that one side of the conflict no longer viewed the Americans as neutral peacekeepers. As time went on the level of violence and hostilities toward the entire MNF heightened. In July Marines began to receive incoming artillery.⁴⁷

As one writer put it ". . . some Muslim or pro-Syrian group had sent Amin Gemayel a smoke signal. The message was brief: Your American friends are not as invincible as you think. Beware."⁴⁸ Instead of attempting to reestablish their impartiality in the eyes of the Lebanese, U.S. policy makers and senior leaders continued to place the Marines in situations that further eroded the premise that they were impartial peacekeepers.

All hope for being perceived as impartial in the conflict was lost after the U.S. participation in the Lebanese defense of Souk el-Gharb in September of 1992. Shortly after the battle for this Shouf mountain range village began between Syrian and Palestinian backed Druse militia and government forces, the Lebanese Army Commander-in-Chief approached the U.S. for help. General Tannous had been hinting that he would like direct U.S. assistance in defeating the militia forces in the mountains. By September 18th his pleas became more direct. According to Tannous, his artillery battalions were running low on ammunition; without U.S. assistance his forces would be overrun. He appealed directly to U.S. Middle East Envoy Robert McFarlane, and his military aide, Brigadier General Carl Stiner. Tannous' account of the situation indicated that the situation was desperate. Without seeking independent confirmation of Tannous' assessment of the situation, McFarlane ordered naval gunfire in support of the government forces. On the morning of the 19th a collection of U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers fired over 360 rounds at suspected militia targets. Following the battle Americans would learn that only eight government soldiers had been killed in the fighting of the previous day.⁴⁹ Significantly, the Marine commander, Colonel Timothy Geraghty protested the move. He knew that his Marines would bear the brunt of the

Muslim's wrath for this blatant support of government forces.⁵⁰ A mere four days latter, on September 23rd, 241 of Geraghty's Marines would die as a Muslim "kamikaze" sped past Lance Corporal Eddie DiFranco on his way to blowing up the Marines' headquarters.⁵¹

Events in Beirut bear many similarities with those observed in Northern Ireland. As in Northern Ireland, one of the belligerents began to identify the PSF as allied with the other. In this case, the Muslims felt the U.S. allied itself with the government forces; the fact that the Gemayel government represented Lebanon's Christian minority further inflamed the Muslims. What began as a peacekeeping mission soon assumed peace enforcement proportions. As the PSF lost its impartiality, they also lost any semblance of consent from the belligerents. Without this consent, the mission evolved from one of PK, to one meeting many of the characteristics of PE. The following section will attempt to find similar patterns in U.S. operations in Somalia.

Somalia

The history of U.S. involvement in Somalia is inexorably linked with decisions and deployments authorized by the U.N. In essence, the U.S. participated in no less than three separate operations which supported larger U.N. operations. U.S. operations included: 1) Operation Provide Relief, which was part of what the U.N. called U.N. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I, August 15th, 1992 through December 9th, 1992), 2) Operation Restore Hope, which the U.N. called U.N. Task Force (UNITAF, December 9th, 1992 through May 4th, 1993), and finally, 3) U.S. Forces in Somalia, which the U.N. called U.N. Operations in Somalia II, (UNOSOM II, May 4th 1993 through March

31st 1994). The first U.S. deployment, known as Operation Provide Relief arrived to find a Somalia devastated by years of internal strife.

In the fall of 1992 Somalia was in a state of chaos. In essence, there was no government. The clans that were battling for control of the nation had destroyed the country, and any semblance of government control was long gone. U.S. forces arrived as a severe drought was inflicting starvation upon Somalia's people. Whatever food did manage to survive this drought was robbed by the warring factions. This famine, and the violence that accompanied it, was only the most recent of many tribulations suffered by the Somalis.⁵²

Beginning in 1981, Somalia had taken many slow and tortuous steps on the path that would lead it to famine, bloodshed, and eventual anarchy. The journey began in 1981, when Somalia, under the leadership of Siad Mohamed Barre, attacked neighboring Ethiopia to gain part of the bordering Ogaden region. As Somalia pressed what would prove to be an unsuccessful fiasco, it found itself inundated by a wave of Ogadeni refugees. As a result of this venture, Somalia was wracked by political instability and economic dislocation. Blaming Barre for the refugees and resulting economic suffering, rival clans' opposition to his rule grew increasingly violent.⁵³

Slowly, Barre's hold on power in Somalia slipped away. In response to the armed insurgencies trying to remove him from power, Barre attacked rival clan bases, killing thousands of innocent civilians in the process. Responding to the Soviet Union's support of neighboring Ethiopia, the United States continued to ship arms to Somalia. In many cases, Barre provided clans loyal to him many of these weapons. Arms became the "coin

of the realm" throughout Somalia. In general, clans loyal to Barre received political favors, influence, and U.S. weapons.⁵⁴ Thus, long before U.S. troops ever set foot in Somalia, U.S. policy was supporting one faction at the expense of another, and indirectly helping to increase the level of violence in the region.

As the level of violence in Somalia increased, the nation's infrastructure sustained widespread devastation. Barre's allies, and his opposition, all played a role in the destruction. As one author noted:

... the forces allied with Barre and the various opposition movements that remained after he left deliberately destroyed much of Somalia's infrastructure and its ability to produce food. The economic disruption fed by the war's destruction fed a cycle of more looting. . . .⁵⁵

Finally, realizing he could not maintain his positions as Somalia's leader, Barre fled Mogadishu in 1991. The continual worsening of both the economic and political situation, coupled with the fall of Barre's regime, further polarized Somalia. Clans became the only source of protection in a nation that was now devoid of any centralized political control. The clans provided Somalis with protection, employment, and food; however, the constant struggle between the clans for control of the nation also doomed it to a future of increasing famine, bloodshed, and violence.⁵⁶

Throughout 1991 various world relief organizations attempted to ameliorate the suffering of the Somali people. Many observers viewed the U.N.'s efforts as sporadic and ineffective. In part, the U.N.'s difficulties were attributed to its decision to move its base from Mogadishu to nearby Nairobi. While the U.N. claimed that increasing violence in Mogadishu necessitated the relocation, many felt it only reduced the organization's ability to support the relief effort. Significantly, some private

organizations, not affiliated with U.N., remained in Mogadishu throughout 1991. In spite of these efforts, the end of 1991 found over 20,000 Somalis dead from famine or violence.⁵⁷

The warlords continued to use food to exact loyalty and favors from their rival factions, and Somalis continued to starve to death. In the meantime, the U.N. attempted to gain the consent of the warlords to provide humanitarian relief.⁵⁸ During this period, the warlord who appeared to wield the most power in this cruel environment was Mohammed Farah Aidid. In June 1992, Aideed consented to deployment of a U.N. observer force that would monitor the distribution of food and medicine in Somalia. At the same time, he continued to withhold approval for the deployment of a 500 man U.N. security force. Finally, in August 1992, the U.N. gained Aideed's approval to deploy this security force to Somalia.⁵⁹

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1992 the U.N. continued to wrestle with the issue of how to protect its relief organizations in Somalia. In spite of the observers and security force, roving bandits and factional violence continued to disrupt the movement of relief supplies throughout Somalia. Finally, in November 1992, then secretary Boutros Ghali "... notified the security council that Somalia's situation 'had deteriorated beyond the point at which it is susceptible to the peacekeeping treatment . . .'"⁶⁰ Clearly, the U.N.'s strategy of using a symbolic military force to encourage negotiations between Somalia's armed militias failed.⁶¹

Finally, on November 25th, 1992, then President George Bush offered U.S. troops to lead a new U.N. operation in Somalia. The U.S. operation, known as Restore Hope,

would support the U.N.'s new UNITAF. The President emphasized that U.S. troops would help create the security environment essential to effective distribution of relief supplies. Furthermore, in an address to the American people on December 4th, he asserted that U.S. forces' role would be limited; overall responsibility for this security function would be assumed by the U.N. as soon as practicable.⁶² Finally, the President emphasized that the role of U.S. forces would be impartial. While they would be expected to apply force when necessary, its use would be even-handed, and regulated by strict rules of engagement. The U.S. would not take sides in Somalia's internal struggle.⁶³

In mid December 1992, U.S. officials again made clear they would remain impartial in Somalia. In communications with Aideed the U.S. emphasized it would eschew any role in determining Somalia's future political structure. In spite of U.N. urgings to become more involved, the U.S. remained determined to maintain its role as an impartial force focused on relieving the plight of Somalia's starving population. The U.N., however, wanted the U.S. to begin disarming the clans.⁶⁴

In spite of its initial resistance to disarming the clans, U.S. forces soon began conducting operations aimed at achieving this objective. By January 1993, U.S. Marines were raiding houses and homes in search of arms caches. Furthermore, by the end of January, U.S. forces attacked an Aideed camp in Mogadishu. For the U.S., the first step in a long campaign against the warlord had begun.⁶⁵

These early policies and actions heralded the loss of impartiality. As one author notes:

Although they were not identified as a political strategy, the ad hoc tactical decisions made by US representatives to deal with militia leaders inevitably had long term consequences that should have been carefully considered in advance. Initial US and UN actions and statements suggested impartial accommodation of the warring factions. Military actions such as raids on suspected weapons caches suggested just the opposite.⁶⁶

Ironically, while it was the U.N. that pressed the U.S. to disarm the clans, it was also the U.N. that conducted negotiations suggesting accommodation of the clans. U.N. meetings with clan elders emphasized that the policy of achieving peace and stability in Somalia was founded on reconciliation between militia leaders. While the U.N. espoused a policy of impartial reconciliation, it continued to press the U.S. to disarm the clans. At the same time, U.S. policy statements began to suggest it preferred alternative civilian groups to lead Somalia into the future.⁶⁷ Reinforcing clan suspicions, U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley characterized U.S. strategy in Somalia as , “plucking the bird.” He elaborated that “. . . you rake one feather at a time . . . the bird doesn’t think there’s anything terrible going on. Then, one day he finds he can’t fly.” Militia leaders were enraged. With every policy statement, every raid, clan leaders had one more reason to doubt the U.S.’s impartiality.⁶⁸ In their view, UNITAF, under American leadership, was not accommodating them - it was attempting to eradicate them.

In all fairness, UNITAF did provide the U.N. with many short term successes. From its activation in December 1992, up until it transferred control to UNOSOM II in May 1993, it restored a level of peace and stability to Somalia. It confiscated numerous “technicals” (crew served weapons mounted on pickup trucks), weapons, and ammunition. So successful were U.S. efforts that U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali

continually delayed termination of UNITAF so as to allow U.S. forces more time to disarm the clans. As a result of this enhanced security environment, the U.N. succeeded in moving more supplies to sick and starving Somalis.⁶⁹ However, the clans were already concerned that their influence in Somalia was marginalized by UNITAF efforts. With the handover of control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the tensions between the clans and the peacekeepers increased.

On 13 May 1993, shortly after the activation of UNOSOM II, the U.N. sponsored additional reconciliation talks. These talks, which Mohamed Aideed requested, were aimed at disengaging militia forces in Somali's central region. The U.N. agreed to pay for the lodging and transportation of all conference participants, even though the conference clearly appeared to serve his objectives most. If the conference succeeded in neutralizing rival militias, he would be able to bring his militia and associated equipment back into Mogadishu. Additionally, U.N. sponsorship of the talks would enhance Aideed's position in the eyes of the Somali people.⁷⁰ Thus, while the U.S. continued to reduce the effectiveness of the clans through its disarmament efforts, the U.N. enhanced the status of one of the clans' leaders.

In the end, the U.N. sponsored conference failed. There were near

... continuous conflicts between Aideed and UNOSOM II ranging on issues from agenda, and conference location to security and the number and types of participants. When it became apparent to Aideed that he was being opposed at every turn by the U.N., he held separate meetings with aligned leaders. ... In the end the Galcayo Conference did little to aid the reconciliation process in the Central Region, but it left the SNA and Aideed extremely frustrated over their ability to control the political process in Somalia.⁷¹

With their clandestine arms caches under near continuous attack from U.S. led forces, and the U.N. marginalizing their leader's political influence, Aideed's forces began to change their tactics. By the end of May, radio broadcasts from Aideed's radio station complex took on a distinctly anti-UNISOM II tone. Additionally, intelligence sources confirmed an increase in activity at his force's authorized storage sites.⁷² It was activity at these sites that soon led to a dramatic increase in the level of violence in Somalia.

Under an agreement with UNITAF, the authorized weapons storage sites were guarded by their respective clan militias. Aideed's clan had five such sites. According to provisions of the agreement, the radio station was also declared by Aideed as one of his faction's sites. UNOSOM believed Aideed declared the radio station as a site to provide his faction with its exclusive use. The agreement also authorized U.N. forces to inspect these sites; the reports that clans were withdrawing weapons and technicals spurred UNISOM II to plan an inspection of the sites. Any discrepancies noted during the subsequent inventory would constitute a serious violation of agreements the clans made with the U.N. The U.N. planned the inspection to occur on 5 June.

Early on the morning of the 5th, the Pakistani Brigade moved to inspect the five Aideed sites which were in their area of responsibility. Five weapons storage sites belonging to a rival faction would not be inspected; the Italian Brigade notified UNOSOM II headquarters on 2 June that the sites were disestablished by the faction in March. The brigade added that all weapons in the site had been "neutralized." Thus, the

result of this last minute information was that the only faction in Mogadishu the U.N. would inspect was Aideed's.⁷³

The events that followed are well known. While inspecting the sites in its area of responsibility, the Pakistani Brigade became the target of angry rock throwing mobs. Later, as the Pakistanis returned to their base, they passed through a series of well planned ambushes. By the day's end, 23 Pakistani soldiers lay dead.⁷⁴ As one observer commented, "That ambitious U.N. mandate, as well as the continuing presence of the multinational contingent, ultimately threatened the Mogadishu power base of one clan warlord, Mohamed Aideed."⁷⁵ Responding to this threat, Aideed finally struck back.

After the 5 June attack on the Pakistanis, any semblance of impartiality was lost. UNOSM II began a well publicized manhunt for Aideed. The level of violence in Somalia quickly escalated, with the mission changing from PK to one that had most of the characteristics of PE. Eventually, 24 U.S. soldiers lost their lives in another ambush on the streets of Mogadishu. Soon after this engagement, President Clinton announced the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces. By 31 March, America's role in Somalia was all but over.⁷⁶

This preceding section describes two operations in which the role of impartiality can be isolated and examined in greater detail. While a number of complex factors led to the demise of peace efforts in both of these troubled regions, the impartiality of the PSF played a significant role. The following section will analyze the role of impartiality, and reach conclusions concerning its consideration as a friendly center of gravity in PSO.

ANALYSIS

The two case studies provide a superb opportunity to develop a better understanding of the role of impartiality in PSO. Furthermore, the studies highlight the complex and dynamic nature characteristic of such operations. Areas that require special scrutiny in order to determine if impartiality can be considered a center of gravity include:

- the circumstances which lead to a loss of impartiality.
- the role impartiality plays across the spectrum of PSO.
- impartiality and its consideration as a center of gravity for the PSF.

The Loss of Impartiality in PSO

During a consensual peacekeeping operation there comes a point where actions taken by the force can push the operation into the more violent realm of peace enforcement. In order to prevent such an unintended escalation, the PSF must protect and maintain its impartiality. FM 100-5, Operations, notes

In PK operations, the impartiality of peacekeepers and the sponsoring state, states, or international organization is critical to success and the legitimacy of the operation. . . . All activities must be conducted without favor to either side or point of view. Because of the nature of PE operations, impartiality and legitimacy may be harder to obtain and sustain.⁷⁷

As already stated, compromised impartiality can be a key factor in an inadvertent crossing of the "consent divide." FM 100-23, Peace Operations, stress that commanders must strive to increase the levels of consent and impartiality while at the same time

reducing the level of force in the operation. A study of both cases seems to indicate that of these three factors (consent, force, and impartiality), the independent variable in each scenario was impartiality. As the PSF repeatedly (and perhaps inadvertently) compromised its impartiality, the level of force required rose, and level of consent, fell. This is not to suggest that a PSF should eschew all use of force; however, it should apply force in a manner that protects its impartiality. In both cases, the injudicious application of force, coupled with ill conceived policies, helped push the operation across the "consent divide." For instance, in Beirut, force was applied during the engagement at Souk-el Gharb. It was not focused, and it did little to protect the image that the PSF was impartial. To the contrary, the application of force in this engagement provided the government's forces with little tactical advantage, while it did further alienate the Muslims. Additionally, the policy of arming and training government forces convinced the Muslims that the peacekeepers were far from impartial. As one author notes:

... by blindly supporting Amin Gemayel, by allowing Israel a virtually free hand to invade Lebanon with American arms and by not curtailing Israel's demands for a peace treaty with Beirut, the Reagan Administration had tipped the scales in favor of one Lebanese tribe - the Maronites- and against others, primarily Muslims.⁷⁸

Reinforcing this point, another author adds:

Certainly the MNF's--particularly the Marine Corps'--role as an impartial peacekeeper had been seriously eroded by the U.S. political decision for the Marines to assist the Christian Gemayel's government and to strengthen the Christian-led Lebanese Army. The U.S. Marines lost the essential element of peacekeeping-- impartiality.⁷⁹

While early U.S. pronouncements led all to believe that the role of the MNF was that of an impartial mediator and guarantor of security, the MNF's actions belied a clear

bias towards the government's forces. As shown in the case study, the high initial level of consent displayed by most of the belligerents in Beirut dropped markedly throughout the operation. The bombing of the Marine Barracks removed any doubt that as the level of impartiality dropped, so dropped the level of consent. With the loss of impartiality, and the lower level of consent, came a corresponding rise in the level of violence. The environment in Beirut no longer met the definition of "peacekeeping."

In Somalia, a combination of flawed policy, coupled with a shortsighted application of force, also resulted in a loss of the PSF's impartiality. Restore Hope succeeded in increasing the flow of relief supplies to starving Somalis, while the PSF successfully protected its impartiality. While there were acts of violence, they were relatively low compared to what was to come.

With the activation of UNITAF, the multinational coalition increased the level of force applied against the militias. Applying a Western paradigm of who should lead Somalia, UNITAF attempted to "... try and pick Somali leaders acceptable to the U.N. without the consent of the Somali people."⁸⁰ Through policy statements such as Ambassador Oakley's, the U.S. left no doubt that it was intent on marginalizing the role of the clans. In a culture where weapons conferred status, the U.N. policy of disarming the clans was a blatant attempt to strip the clans of their status. In effect, the U.S. allied itself with non-Aideed clans.⁸¹ In PSO such alliances are counterproductive, and cause irreparable damage to success of the mission. As one author comments:

During operations where a government does not exist, peacekeepers must avoid actions that would effectively confer legitimacy on one individual or organization at the expense of another. Because every military move will inevitably affect the local political situation, peacekeepers must learn to

conduct operations without appearing to take sides in internal disputes between competing factions.⁸²

Aideed finally struck back on June 5th, 1993. In Somalia, "A multilateral effort had become a unilateral one. U.S. interests became confused with the original mandate. Neutrality and impartiality was lost, and with it, trust. Hostilities ensued, and disaster was the outcome."⁸³ Clearly, the debacle in Somalia was directly attributable to the PSF's loss of impartiality.⁸⁴

Both cases demonstrate that the application of force must be in consonance with the mandate, and must be applied impartially. Furthermore, the population must perceive that the PSF is applying force in an impartial manner. The force must maintain its impartiality throughout the operation. The essence of contemporary PSO is neither the level of force, nor how this force is applied. The key is intervention and continued operations that are predicated on mutual consent and the maintenance of impartiality. Force must be applied in a judicious, restrained, and focused manner. Above all, its application cannot violate the PSF's impartiality.⁸⁵

Impartiality Across the Spectrum of PSO.

In order to understand the role of impartiality across the spectrum of PSO, a deeper understanding of the relationship force plays in both PK and PE is essential. The application of force can create adverse impressions in the eyes of belligerents and noncombatants; thus, it is imperative that it is applied in a manner consistent with the nature of these PSOs.

Both Somalia and Beirut are vivid examples of PK operations that evolved into PE. While U.S. doctrine states that force is applied in PK only for self defense, PE is

characterized by a more liberal application of force. Typically, PE operations are characterized by the use of force to coerce belligerents to refrain from violent actions.

As FM 100-5, Operations, notes

Peace enforcement implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions. Units conducting peace enforcement, therefore, cannot maintain their objective neutrality in every instance. They must be prepared to restore order, to separate warring factions, and to return the environment to conditions more conducive to civil order and discipline.⁸⁶

Using these definitions, it is apparent that while initial operations in Beirut fall into the category of PK, initial operations in Somalia do not. As the case study noted, forces assigned to UNOSOM I used force to protect relief convoys, thus moving beyond the traditional application of force in PK (self defense). However, UNOSOM I forces did not use force to coerce, they merely used force to protect convoys. Essentially, there is a “gray area” between the U.S. definition of PK and PE. A better understanding of this “gray area” provides a clearer understanding of the “interactive” nature of impartiality.

Emerging US doctrine distinguishes between PK (consent, impartiality, restraint) and PE (no consent, use of force); however, it does not account for a category of PSO that U.N. and various other foreign peacekeepers have identified. The British Army has coined the phrase “wider peacekeeping” to describe this form of PSO. The British view is that “wider peacekeeping” describes a category of PSO in which the belligerents consent to third party intervention; however, the environment remains highly volatile.⁸⁷

The British link impartiality to ‘wider peacekeeping’ as they observe

Impartiality is a crucial determinant of the methods by which force might be employed. As a guideline it should therefore be uppermost in the minds of commanders. The abandonment of impartiality equates to the

abandonment of the Wider Peacekeeping contingent's third party supervisory role.”⁸⁸

While British doctrine makes clear that “Commanders should use the impartiality criterion as a critical determinant of all planning and conduct including, for example, the use of force. . . . ,”⁸⁹ they assert that commanders should apply force when required. The British warn that the need to protect the PSF’s impartiality should not be construed as a prohibition on the offensive application of force in “wider peacekeeping.” The key to the application of force in this environment is its *even handed [impartial] use irrespective of factions, and in strict accordance with the PSF’s mandate*.⁹⁰ Elaborating on the key role impartiality plays, NATO doctrine simply states that the loss of impartiality will have adverse an adverse impact on the PSF’s ability to accomplish its mission.⁹¹

Thus, a PSF involved in traditional PK must maintain a high level of impartiality in its dealing with all sides of a conflict. The level of consent in such operations is high, and force is only applied in self defense. Taking the British view of “wider peacekeeping” as the next level of PSO, the level of impartiality the PSF maintains is also high. As is the case in traditional PK, the level of consent is high. Recognizing that the “wider peacekeeping” environment is volatile, *force may be applied beyond self defense*. When applied, it must be even handed, limited, and in accordance with the international mandate authorizing the operation. Finally PE presents a situation where the level of violence is high, and consent is low. In such an environment, the level of impartiality and consent is low. In PE, the PSF normally employs “. . . conventional combat operations to achieve its objectives.”⁹²

Across the spectrum of peace operations, the role of impartiality is clear. Both case studies demonstrate that:

Compromised impartiality may trigger an uncontrollable escalation from a PK to a PE situation by crossing the consent divide. . . . Regardless of the type of operations, commanders should always strive to increase levels of consent and impartiality and reduce the levels of force.⁹³

Compromised impartiality can have grave consequences upon the outcome of a PK operation.⁹⁴ Impartiality plays a key role in PSO, since it helps facilitate successful accomplishment of the mission. Operations studied in this monograph reveal that its loss can lead to failure. Therefore, since impartiality appears to enable the PSO to perform its mission, is it a center of gravity?

Impartiality as a Center of Gravity

Recalling our discussion of the center of gravity in Section III of this monograph, some key characteristics emerged. First, as Clausewitz noted, the center of gravity can indeed be an idea. As previously noted, the center of gravity could be an alliance, or even the moral of the people. While Clausewitz did emphasize the center of gravity was often the mass of troops, his framework was conventional interstate war. Although Clausewitz did not address irregular warfare, nor did he even conceive of PSO, his writings made clear that the operational artist could indeed consider non-physical factors as centers of gravity.

Our discussion of the contemporary theories of the center of gravity also highlighted the writings of Colonel John A. Warden. In likening an opponent to a system, Warden left open the possibility of multiple centers of gravity. While such a framework of analysis may cause the planner to consider far more centers of gravity than

feasible or necessary, there is merit to Warden's concept. It would be far too simplistic, and perhaps equally meaningless, to apply a conventional paradigm to the PSO environment. As Peace Operations stresses, the enemy in PSO is not the belligerents, it is the conflict.⁹⁵ It is an idea.

Thus building on the theories of Clausewitz and Warden, and applying them to an environment profoundly different from conventional operations, it is indeed reasonable to consider impartiality as a possible friendly center of gravity. The evidence presented in this monograph demonstrates that without impartiality, the PSF is incapable of accomplishing its mission within the context of a PK or "wider peacekeeping" mission. In both case studies, PSF's equipped with modern weaponry, superior resources, and international mandates failed to accomplish their missions within the parameters under which they were deployed. Abandonment of impartiality led to failure in Beirut, and to the near collapse of UNOSOM II in Somalia.⁹⁶

Events during both of these operations bring into sharper focus the power impartiality imparts to the friendly force. Impartiality enables the force to accomplish its mission. As one author noted:

Forces conducting peacekeeping have a center of gravity which may be their credibility as an impartial force between the belligerents. When that credibility is lost, they become simply another armed force in the conflict area and cease to be a peacekeeping force.⁹⁷

In proposing impartiality as a center of gravity, an issue often raised is that consideration of such diverse and abstract concepts will only reduce the utility of the center of gravity as a tool of analysis. Nothing could be further from the truth. As already noted, members of the U.S. Joint Task Force planning Operation Uphold

Democracy considered an abstract concept, namely “instability,” as the enemy center of gravity in the operational design of the mission in Haiti. Focusing on this center of gravity, the planners were able to devise a plan which focused on key decisive points to restore peace and stability to the island nation. Some of these decisive points included restoration of the police force, military, and economic system. Thus, use of an abstract concept as a center of gravity did have utility in a PK operation.⁹⁸

The operational planner should consider impartiality as a possible friendly center of gravity. By considering such a center of gravity, the friendly force may find that decisive points requiring “protection” may include effective Rules of Engagement (ROE) to regulate the application of force, frequent contact with representatives of all parties to the conflict to ensure clear understanding of PSF actions, and broad use of PSYOPS units to assure the populace understands the intent of the PSF. Recognizing the key role impartiality plays in the ability of the friendly force to accomplish its mission helps focus combat power, resources, and avoid escalation to a PE scenario.

CONCLUSION

This monograph has examined the role of impartiality in peace operations, and its consideration as a center of gravity. Using the British experience in Northern Ireland as a point of departure, it has reviewed operations in Beirut and Somalia to reach conclusions concerning the monograph question. This final section will elaborate on decisive points suggested in the preceding section, and finally, it will answer the monograph question, “Is the impartiality of the friendly force a center of gravity?”

As previously suggested, there are decisive points associated with a center of gravity identified as the PSF’s impartiality. These include the application force, and information. By protecting these decisive points the force can protect its impartiality. The first decisive point this section will consider is force.

As both case studies reveal, the improper application of force was a common flaw in both operations. Belligerents in both Beirut and Somalia viewed the application of force by the PSF as biased; indeed its misuse helped destroy the PSF’s perceived impartiality. The operational planner of future PSOs must consider how force will be applied in an impartial manner. As NATO doctrine for PSOs suggests, “Force may be used, particularly in self-defence and in defence of the mandate, without compromising impartiality; however, its use must be carefully controlled. . . .”⁹⁹ The maintenance of impartiality (sometimes referred to as neutrality in NATO publications) does not suggest a passive approach to the application of force.¹⁰⁰ As previously noted, the force must develop and adhere to ROE that allows the PSF to respond to hostile acts and apply force

in accordance with the mandate. In all cases, the PSF must avoid applications of force which seem to be targeting specific factions.¹⁰¹ As events in Northern Ireland, Beirut, and Somalia suggest, continued attacks on specific factions only leads to an escalation of violence throughout the theater.

While not referred to in literature concerning peace operations, the planner must also be aware of a phenomenon that can only be referred to as inequitable distribution of “force potential.” For instance, by arming and training government forces in Beirut, the U.S. greatly improved the Lebanese Army’s potential to apply force. In doing so, the U.S. compromised its impartiality, further destabilizing the region. As already noted, Muslims viewed this act as a clear violation of the PSF’s impartiality.

Recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina suggest that military planners do recognize that care must be taken when distributing “force potential.” For example, it is widely known, through both print and electronic media, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, advised against U.S. military participation in any planned arming and training of Bosnian Muslims. Such a training plan would be a clear violation of the impartiality the PSF must seek to protect; by eschewing such a plan the Chairman helped protect that impartiality.

By counseling against U.S. military involvement in plans to arm and train Bosnian Muslims, the Chairman also avoided even the perception that the PSF was biased. This highlights the role that perceptions, and information, play in protecting the impartiality of the PSF. Maintaining a free and accurate flow of information is an essential component of all PSOs. Even in PE, where the PSF’s level of impartiality is

low, it is imperative that accurate information flows freely to all parties in the conflict. Planners must ensure that both PSYOPS and public affairs assets are used to ensure policies and actions taken by the PSF are clearly understood by the populace.¹⁰² Linking information to the impartial application of force, U.S. doctrine notes that:

[the] Use of force must be impartially applied in traditional peacekeeping operations. This requires close coordination with public/civil affairs and psychological teams. In operations that go beyond traditional peacekeeping impartiality may not apply, but coordination with public affairs and PSYOPS remains important.¹⁰³

Inaccurate or flawed information can create an environment of suspicion and mistrust. Such an environment can lead to a perception that the PSF is not impartial. A key theme here is that the PSF must not only act impartial, but also, it must be perceived as impartial.

Threats to impartiality will thrive on misunderstanding . . . commanders should make repeated efforts at the earliest opportunity to explain clearly the role of their forces and to develop the best possible relations with all elements of the local communities. Regular contacts and conference opportunities will need to be maintained. . . .¹⁰⁴

Effective use of PSYOP assets can help the commander in this regard.¹⁰⁵ These teams can provide the commander with valuable insight as to how a planned action will be perceived by various groups, while also using selected assets to preclude misunderstanding. If a PSF's actions result in misunderstanding, PSYOPS teams have the ability to rapidly explain the action and dispel rumors.¹⁰⁶ As NATO PSO doctrine observes, "Effective communications and transparency of operations are key to maintaining impartiality, which should also ensure the continuing consent of the parties."¹⁰⁷

In conclusion, the operational planner should consider impartiality as a possible center of gravity when developing the operational design of a potential PSO. Using both classical and contemporary definitions of a center of gravity, an examination of the role of impartiality in various PSOs reveals that it was a friendly center of gravity. Impartiality enables the force to accomplish its mission; it is both a prerequisite to the operation, and continuing source of power for the PSF. When used as a tool of analysis for the operational design of a PSO, impartiality as a center of gravity helps the planner focus finite resources in a manner that effectively protects decisive points. Without impartiality, the force must accept a higher level of hostility, and plan for a corresponding greater application of force. More significantly, a loss of impartiality can mean that the PSF is no longer able to accomplish its mission within the context that it was deployed (i.e., a PK or “wider peacekeeping” scenario). In many cases, international or domestic factors may preclude the PSF’s further participation in a more hostile environment, thus leaving the region without little hope of a return to peace and stability. Clearly, the operational planer should consider impartiality as a possible friendly center of gravity in PSO.

¹ James Dubik, "The New Logic: The US Needs Capability Based, Not Threat Based Military Forces," *Armed Forces Journal International* 134, no. 6 (January 1997): 44.

² Patrick Paxton, "Future Seizes Operations Other Than War," *Army Times* 57, no. 18 (November 25, 1997): 8.

³ James A. Winnefeld and others, *Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: Implications for the Army in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1995), 112.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁵ Jay W. Smith, "Operational Art in Military Operations Other than War." (Masters Thesis, United States Naval War College, 1995), 2.

⁶ *Ibid.* 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁸ James J. Schneider, *School of Advanced Military Studies Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational Art*, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 27.

⁹ John M. Keefe, *Stuck in the Middle: The Operational Art of Peace Enforcement*, (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 10-12.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹² *Ibid.*, 15.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 596.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 486.

¹⁷ Ibid., 596.

¹⁸ Schneider, 56.

¹⁹ U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 1993), 6-7.

²⁰ Ibid., 6-7.

²¹ Canadian Forces, CFP 300-1, *Conduct of Land Operations* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces, February 1996), 4-4.

²² John A. Warden, "The Enemy as a System," *Airpower Journal* 9 (Spring 95): 11-12.

²³ SAMS class notes. In-class discussions revealed that U.S. planners developing Operation Uphold Democracy identified *instability* as the "enemy" center of gravity. Furthermore, in their operational design, they identified decisive points such as restoration of law and order, economic reform, and weapons "buy-backs," as best suited to neutralization of the center of gravity.

²⁴ U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 1994), 12.

²⁵ Ibid., 4.

²⁶ Ibid., 13.

²⁷ Ibid., 6.

²⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), *NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations Draft, Change 1* (Mons, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, 1994), 4.

²⁹ U.S. Army, FM 100-23, 7.

³⁰ Ibid., 13-17.

³¹ Ibid., 13.

³² NATO, 3.

³³ U.S. Army, FM 100-23, 14.

³⁴ Jerome H. Kahan, "Peace Support Operations: Senior Military Perspectives," in *Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military*, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 77.

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³⁶ H.L. Dixon and others, *Operational Art in Low Intensity Conflict* (Langley Air Force Base: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1987), 1.

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⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 190-192.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 191.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 192.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 194.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁴⁷ Thomas H. Hayden, "Somalia - What Went Wrong?" *Marine Corps Gazette* 78, no. 9 (September 1994): 51.

⁴⁸ Friedman, 51.

⁴⁹ Friedman, 200-201.

⁵⁰ Friedman, 201.

⁵¹ Friedman, 201.

⁵² Barry McCaffrey, "U.S. Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations," in *Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military*, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (Washington D.C. : National Defense University Press, 1994), 4-5.

⁵³ Richard W. Conroy, "Beyond Peacekeeping: Strategies of United Nations Peace Enforcement in a Turbulent World" (Ph. D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 1994), 132.

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⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 135.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 136-137.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 153.

⁶¹ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 33.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 34.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 42-43.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁶⁹ Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 17-18.

⁷⁰ Thomas J. Daze, "Centers of Gravity of United Nations Operations Somalia II" (Masters Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 57.

⁷¹ Ibid., 58.

⁷² Ibid., 59.

⁷³ Ibid., 61-62.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 63.

⁷⁵ Allard, 20.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 20.

⁷⁷ U.S. Army, FM 100-5, 18.

⁷⁸ Friedman, 204.

⁷⁹ Hayden, 51.

⁸⁰ Hayden, 51.

⁸¹ Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, "U.N. and U.S. Military Roles in Regional Organizations in Africa and the Middle East," in *Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military*, ed. Dennis Quinn (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 163

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⁸³ Lakidi, 162.

⁸⁴ Kahan, 77.

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⁹² NATO, 3.

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¹⁰⁰ Bullock, 104.

¹⁰¹ U.K. Army, 2-11.

¹⁰² U.S. Army, *Application of Peace Enforcement: Operations at Brigade and Battalion* (Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army Infantry School, 1994), B-1-2. (hereafter referred to as *Application of Peace Enforcement*)

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¹⁰⁶ Ibid., J-2.

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